INTRODUCTION
Cross-examination has been labeled as the most efficient engine ever devised for the discovery of truth, 1 and defense lawyers traditionally refer to it as "the bulwark of liberty." 2 The prosecutor, however, uses cross-examination to fulfill more than just an obligation to a particular client; he is charged not merely with the task of convicting a person accused of a crime, but rather with the broader responsibility of seeking justice. 3 The prosecutor, therefore, may consider cross-examination to be the sword of justice.
The prosecutor exercises his right of crossexamination' in an effort to strengthen his own case s as well as to weaken the case of the defense. This is accomplished by discrediting the testimony of the witness on the stand, using the testimony to discredit or minimize the testimony of other witnesses, using that testimony to corroborate the favorable testimony of prosecution witnesses, or using it to contribute independently to the prosecution's own case. The purpose of this article is to examine the permissible methods by which these trial tactics can be accomplished. To do so, attention has been given to the general areas of allowable inquiry as well as to the specific form required of individual questions. 8 The words "proper," "allowable," "acceptable," and their opposites have been used to refer to the general judicial opinion of the matter under discussion. Not all techniques or particular questions labeled as "improper" automatically require the reversal of a conviction, but the conscious entry into a frowned upon area may bring a prosecutor into conflict with the high professional standards to which he should aspire.
I TMn LImTAuONS Or SCOPE
The general background of a witness is almost always an area of legitimate inquiry. Questions may be asked pertaining to residence, 9 marital status 0 and employment.E One may ask about a witness' previous whereabouts 2 1971) . 'See Sears v. State, 282 N.E.2d 807 (Ind. 1972 ) (any doubt as to the legitimacy of a question should be resolved in favor of the examiner). The holding of this case is tempered by numerous examples cited infra. 9Commonwealth v. Arsenault, 280 N.E.2d 129 (Mass. 1972) . 10 Commonwealth v. Libby, 266 N.E.2d 641 (Mass. 1971 ) (tended to show adultery); Porter v. State, 440 P.2d 249 (Wyo. 1968 ) (questions of marriage and child custody).
n People v. Suriwka, 2 Ill. App. 3d 384, 276 N.E.2d 490 (1971) ; People v. Hough, 102 Ill. App. 2d 287, 243 N.E.2d 520 (1968) ; Bolin v. Commonwealth, 407 S.W.2d 431 (Ky. 1966) , cert. denied, 386 U.S. 946 (1967) .
12 State v. Brooks, 107 Ariz. 320, 487 P.2d 387 (1971) (proper to ask defendant's whereabouts at the time of his arrest).
13 Butler v rule has received significant impetus through the recently proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. Those rules have adopted the practice of allowing cross-examination on any matter relevant to the case (including credibility)' 8 One can reasonably expect that the federal example will lead to greater acceptance of the "wide open" rule.'
9
The vast majority of the states presently subscribe to the view that cross-examination must be limited to those matters testified to on direct examination." 0 Subject to fifth amendment limitations, the guidelines which govern the prosecutor's inquiry generally apply to defendants as well as to non-party witnesses. Cross-examination may be based upon matters "covered on," ' "gone into on," " "touched on," 2 responsive or relevant to," fendants and their wives to the scope of the direct, all others can be crossed on the entire case). witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility. In the interests of justice, the judge may limit cross-examination with respect to matters not testified to on direct examination." The comment following the rule states that it does not purport to resolve the constitutional questions raised by a defendant's fifth amendment waiver.
The proposed federal rule represents an about-face from the rule proposed in 1969 which limited cross examination to the scope of the direct.
Other jurisdictions providing by statute for the wide open rule are Missouri supra note 17, and LA.
Philadelphia & Trenton R.R. v. Stimpson, 39 U.S. 448 (1840) (one of the earliest cases standing for the limited rule); United States v. Prionas, 438 F.2d 1049 (8th Cir.) , cert. denied, 402 U.S. 977 (1971) ; Lewis v. United States, 373 F.2d 576 (9th Cir.) , cert. denied, 389 U.S. 880 (1967) ; People v. Lynn, 16 Cal. App. 3d 259, 94 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1971) ; State v. Stevens, 93 Idaho 48, 454 P.2d 945 (1969) ; People v. Clark, 96 Ill. App. 2d 247, 238 N.E.2d 220 (1968) ; People v. Sisti, 87 Ill. App. 2d 107, 230 N.E.2d 500 (1967) ; State v. Harrington, 178 N.W.2d 314 (Iowa 1970) ; State v. Broten, 176 N.W.2d 827 (Iowa 1970) ; State v. A~lnut, 261 Iowa 897,156 N.W.2d 266 (1966) ; Jenkins v. State, 14 Md. App. 1, 285 A.2d 667 (1971) ; State v. Dalton, 433 S.W.2d 562 (Mo. 1968) ; State v. McClinton, 418 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. 1967) ; People v. Rahming, 26 N.Y.2d 411, 259 N.E.2d 727 (1970) .
2See Storie v. State, 254 Ind. 301, 258 N.E.2d 849 (1970) .
"See State v. Coyne, 452 S.W.2d 227 (Mo. 1970 ) (defendant on direct said he made an untrue statement to police, proper to cross on it).
2See State v. Bagley, 339 Mo. 215, 96 S.W.2d 331 (1936) . 24 See State v. Mirschl, 208 Kan. 111, 490 P.2d 917 (1971) ; State v. Roth, 200 Kan. 677, 438 P.2d 58 (1968) .
connected with 25 and within the fair purview of the direct examination. 6 Cross-examination, however, is not limited to a mere categorical review of the direct examinationY In addition to a large body of supporting caselaw,2 this limited rule of cross-examination has been formally codified in certain jurisdictions. 29 A major argument for this limited rule is that it promotes the orderly presentation of the case. 3 0 Quite interestingly, however, a reason given by the drafters for the adoption of the new "wide" federal rule is that it would save the time spent bickering over objections regarding scope 2 ' Under the majority view, the asking of questions outside the scope of the direct is often enough in itself to require reversal.n Whether a reversal is required will depend upon the merits of each individual casen and may hinge upon the existence of 15 See Philadelphia & Trenton R.R. v. Stimpson, 39 U.S. 448 (1840) .
26 See State v. Dalton, 433 S.W.2d 562 (Mo. 1968) . 22 See People v. Eisenberg, 266 Cal. App. 2d 606, 72 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1968) ; State v. Dalton, 433 S.W.2d 562 (Mo. 1968 ); State v. Bagley, 339 Mo. 215, 96 S.W.2d 331 (1936) . 28 See, e.g., cases cited note 20 supra. Evidence (1937-38) which wrote, The rule limiting cross-examination to the precise subject of the direct examination is probably the most frequent rule (except the Opinion rule) leading in trial practice today to refined and technical quibbles which obstruct the progress of the trial, confuse the jury, and give rise to appeal on technical grounds only. Some of the instances in which Supreme Courts have ordered new trials for the mere transgression of this rule about the order of evidence have been astounding. We recommend that the rule allowing questions upon any part of the issue known to the witness... be adopted .... Cir. 1962 ) (defendant's wife testified to time he left house, was crossed as to whether he gave her money when he returned); Wilson v. United States, 4 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1925 ); State v. McClinton, 418 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. 1967) ; People v. Rahming, 26 N.Y.2d 411, 259 N.E.2d 727 (1970) (error to widen cross to lay foundation for rebuttal); Rodriguez v. State, 442 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. 1969 ) (defendant questioned regarding the truthfulness of a co-indictee's testimony at a separate trial); State v. Belwood, 27 Utah 214, 494 P.2d 519 (1972) (cross far exceeded scope).
13 See, e.g., State v. McClinton, 418 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. 1967) .
prejudice to the accused's substantive rights.8 Other errors in the course of a trial may be compounded by questioning outside the scope of the direct 5 The permissible scope of inquiry may be greatly broadened, however, by sweeping denials of guilt by the defendant on direct examination. 86 unduly prejudiced. 7 The trial judge has the discretionary power to limit to scope of "wide open" cross-examination as well as to expand the scope of limited cross. 4 " As previously noted, 49 cross examination in a jurisdiction following the rule of limited scope is not confined to a mere categorical review of those matters gone into on direct examination. 0 Numerous tests have been formulated by the courts to express the relationship that proper cross-examination must bear to the direct. Many of these appear to require identity of transaction or dose proximity in time and space. 5 More liberal is the view that cross-examination may cover all reasonable and logical inferences of the direct. 5 ' Typically, crossexamination is permitted if it tends to clarify, 5 ' Cir.), rev 'd, 350 U.S. 807 (1955) (error only if discretion is abused); People v. Swingle, 28 App. Div. 2d 1063 , 284 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1967 (discretion not disturbed unless injustice present or plain abuse).
4T
See United States v. Pledger, 409 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1969 ) (reverse if probative value outweighed by prejudice).
4"See PRoposED FED. R. Evm. 611(b), supra note 18 ("In the interests of justice, the judge may limit cross-examination with respect to matters not testified to on direct examination." This is to avoid confusion and protraction of the case). See also PRoPosED FED.
R. Evm. 611(a):
Control by judge-The judge shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. 49 See cases cited note 27 supra; State v. Jensen 776 (Mo. 1968) .
50 But there is some case law which holds that if the cross-examiner goes beyond the bounds of the direct and draws out a new fact, the witness becomes the examiner's own and impeachment on that new fact is not permitted. See Pollard v. State, 201 Ind. 180, 166 N.E. 654 (1929) ; State v. Spurr, 100 W.Va. 121, 130 S.E. 81 (1925) . An extension of the direct will not require reversal, however, unless damaging to the defendant's case. See State v. Kelley, 161 N.W.2d 123 (Iowa 1968) . This combination of rules appears to put the prosecutor in a most disadvantaged position. If he draws a favorable fact he is reversed, yet a negative fact may stand unchallenged. 51 See McCoRMcK §21; State v. Jesser, 95 Idaho 43, 501 P.2d 727 (1972) .
2 See People v. Doebke, I Cal. App. 3d 931, 81 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1969) (defendant implied on direct that he didn't sell narcotics to an undercover man by saying he had none to sell, but he never actually denied the sale. Cross as to marijuana delivery was proper).
"See United States v. Crawford, 438 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1971) ; State v. Sweazea, 460 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. 1970 ) (defendant testified he had been drinking, could cross as to amount was proper); State v. Baca, 80 N.M. 488, 458 P.2d 92 (1969) (crossed on prior qualify, M elaborate, 5 " explain,"
6 modify 57 or discredit-I the testimony offered on direct examinacriminal charges which were mentioned on direct); State v. Anaya, 79 N.M. 43, 439 P.2d 561 (1968) (questioning as to penitentiary sentence was proper); Rapp v. State, 418 P.2d 357 (Okla. 1966) ; Crumsey v. State, 460 S.W.2d 858 (Tenn. 1970 ) (defendant testified as to prior guilty pleas, cross to clarify was proper). See Leeper v. United States, 446 F.2d 281 (10th Cir. 1971) , cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1021 (1972) (cross proper which embraces any matter germane to direct, qualifies or destroys it, or tends to elucidate, modify, explain, contradict or rebut testimony given in chief). See also People v. Eisenberg, 266 Cal. App. 2d 606, 72 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1968) . 55 See Issac v. United States, 431 F.2d 11 (9th Cir. 1970 ) (defendant testified to a guilty plea, could cross as to nature of charge); United States v. D'Antonio, 362 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1966) , cerl. denied, 385 U.S. 900 (1966) (government agent called as a defense witness to testify that the search of defendant's trailer yielded no ink, bond paper, or a printing press; could properly cross as to what was found: metal punch, welding rods, miscellaneous auto keys, walkie talkies and a police radio); People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818, 299 P.2d 243 (1956) , cerf. denied, 355 U.S. 846 (1957) (defendant mentioned schooling, could cross as to attendance; defendant testified to his height 6'6', it was collateral but not requiring reversal to question if he attempted to stretch his height to 6'8" to gain an army discharge); State v. Rodriguez, 93 Idaho 286, 460 P.2d 711 (1969) (defendant testified to prior trouble, could question what kind of trouble); State v. Baca, 80 N.M. 488, 458 P.2d 92 (1969) (questioning additional criminal conduct); State v. Anaya, 79 N.M. 43, 439 P.2d 561 (1968) ; Griffith v. State, 430 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. 1968 ) (could fill out fragmentary information regarding prior convictions); State v. Solomon, 5 Wash. App. 412, 487 P.2d 643 (1971) (cross as to whereabouts on night in question after denial of presence at crime scene).
56See People v. Conrad, 81 Ill. App. 2d 34, 225 N.E.2d 713 (1967) , aff 'd, 41 Ill. 2d 13, 241 N.E.2d 423 (1968) ( proper cross regarding defendant's actions while inebriated and unable to control self; proper to cross a medical witness in order to explain his direct testimony); Blair v. Commonwealth, 458 S.W.2d 761 (Ky. 1970) (can cross as to prior conviction brought out without explanation on direct); Lewis v. State, 458 P.2d 309 (Okla. 1969 ); State v. Etheridge, 74 Wash. 2d 102, 443 P.2d 536 (1968) (could cross as to use of stolen credit cards referred to on direct).
5 See People v. Conrad, 81 Ill. App. 2d 34, 225 N.E.2d 713 (1967 ), aff'd, 41 Ill. 2d 13, 241 N.E.2d 423 (1968 ; Rapp v. State, 418 P.2d 357 (Okla. 1966) ; State v. Baca, 80 N.M. 488, 458 P.2d 92 (1969) ; State v. Anaya, 79 N.M. 43, 439 P.2d 561 (1968) .
Is See United States v. Crawford, 438 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1971) ; State v. Miranda, 3 Ariz. App. 550, 416 P.2d 444 (1966) (could cross as to why defendant was a passenger in his own vehicle); Sherwood v. State, 271 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1972) (direct testimony about honorable discharge from army, could cross as to misconduct while in service); People v. Hough, 102 Ill. App. 2d 287, 243 N.E.2d 520 (1968) ; State v. Baca, 80 N.M. 488, 458 P.2d 92 (1969) ; State v. Anaya, 79 N.M. 43, 439 P.2d 561 (1968) ; State v. Garcia, 78 N.M. 136, 429 P.2d 334 (1967) (could cross to determine completeness of father's information); tion. Also proper are questions which tend to elicit additional relevant details regarding matters explored on direct. 59 Within limits, a witness may be asked the whereabouts of persons mentioned in direct testimony," 5 and often the examiner may even probe into the witness' personal associations."
When discussing the permissible scope of crossexamination courts frequently use the phrase "the door has been opened." This rather imprecise legal shorthand refers to the privilege of the crossexaminer to tender questions on subjects "opened" in direct testimony. 6 Cir.5, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 940 (1965) (could cross as to finances, savings account, investments); People v. Dotson, 46 Cal. 2d 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956) (defendant mentioned he was a marine, could cross about dishonorable discharge); People v. Goodsin, 261 Cal. App. 2d 723, 68 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1968) (could cross as to pror use of narcotics); People v. Yonder, 44 IBI. 2d 376, 256 N.E.2d 321 (1969) , cert. denied, 397 U.S. 975 (1970) (could cross as to sources of income); State v. Broten, 176 N.W.2d 827 (Iowa 1970) (could cross as to Golden Gloves activity of manslaughter defendant); State v. Fahy, 201 Kan. 366, 440 P.2d 566 (1968) People v. Matola, 259 Cal. App. 2d 686, 66 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1968) (cross of defendant's credibility subject to court discretion); Harris v. United States, 371 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1967) (wide scope to cross on credibilityfinancial stake); Fagundes v. United States, 340 F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1965 ) (defendant's credibility opened); Sorrells v. State, 44 Ala. App. 481, 213 So. 2d 687 (1968) (defendant's credibility opened); Braxton v. State, 11 Md. App. 435, 274 A.2d 647 (1971) ; Boone v. State, 2 Md. App. 80, 233 A.2d 476 (1967) (defendant's credibility in issue even if stand taken solely to demonstrate lack of voluntariness of a prior statement); People v. Koontz, 24 Mich. App. 336, 180 N.W.2d 202 (1970) (defendant's credibility in issue, could be crossed on prior convictions); People v. Brown, 23 Mich. App. 625, 179 N.W.2d 235 (1970) (defendant's credibility in issue, could be crossed on prior criminal record); Jones v. State, 453 P.2d 393 (Okla. 1969) ; (defendant taking stand puts veracity in issue, impeached on bad checks passed); Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 432 Pa. 571, 248 A.2d 295 (1968) , vacated and remanded for resentencing, 408 U.S. 934 (1972) (defendant's credibility in issue, could be crossed like any other witness); Commonwealth v. Connolly, 217 Pa. Super. 201, 269 A.2d 390 (1970) (can impeach defendant's credibility with prior felony or misdemeanor crmenfalsi convictions). See also PROPOSED FED. R. Evm. 607; CAL. Ev. CODE §785 (West 1966 Commonwealth v. Barron, 438 Pa. 259, 264 A.2d 710, appeal dismissed, 439 Pa. 614, 266 A.2d 476 (1970) (defendant's taking stand and mention of his parole does not put character in issue).
7 See State v. Wyman, 270 A.2d 460 (Me. 1970); Braxton v. State, 11 Md. App. 435, 274 A.2d 647 (1971) . 74 See Hattaway v. United States, 416 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1969 ) (testimony that defendant was raised in a good Christian home and was concerned about her children put general character in issue); Sorrells v. State, 44 Ala. App. 481, 213 So. 2d 687 (1968) (defendant only puts character in issue with affirmative evidence or testimony). See also State v. Hartsell, 272 N.C. 710, 158 S.E.2d 785 (1968) ; State v. Hudson, 1 Wash. App. 813, 463 P.2d 786 (1970) . 75 See Tucker v. United States, 5 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1925 Burton v. State, 207 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1968 ); State v. Schroeder, 201 Kan. 811, 443 P.2d 284 (1968) ; State v. Domino, 234 La. 950, 102 So. 2d 227 (1958) ; Raimondi v. State, 12 Md. App. 322, 278 A.2d 664 (1971) Wright v. State, 243 Ark. 221, 419 S.W.2d 320 (1967) ; People v. Tinsley, 128 Ili. App. 2d 440, 262 N.E.2d 4 (1970) ; People v. April, 97 Il. App. 2d 1, 239 N.E.2d 285 (1968) ; State v. McClain, 404 S.W.2d 186 (Mo. 1966) , cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1016 (1967) ; State v. McElroy, 22 Ohio App. 2d 103, 258 N.E.2d 460 (1970) . 78 See Speers v. United States, 387 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1967 ), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 956 (1968 ; People v. Burnis, 49 111. 2d 98, 273 N.E.2d 605 (1971) ; Stone v. State, 254 Ind. 301, 258 N.E.2d 849 (1970) ; Shuemak v. State, 254 Ind. 117, 258 N.E.2d 158 (1970) .
79 See People v. Russel, 27 Mich. App. 654, 183 N.W.2d 845 (1970) ; State v. Ross, 275 N.C. 550, 169 S.E.2d 875 (1969 ), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1050 (1970 . 80 State v. Johnson, 261 Iowa 661, 155 N.W. 2d 512 (1968) not mean that he may artificially limit the scope of the cross-examination regarding the substantive issues of the case. 8 2 As a general rule, for example, a defendant who testifies to part of a conversation or transaction can be examined by the prosecutor as to the rest of it.P Cross-examination which tests the overall reliability of a witness' direct testimony without being inherently prejudicial,M is dearly within the scope of the direct examination 8 ' There are a number of specific areas of inquiry, however, whose connection with the direct must be demonstrated with greater specificity in order to remain permissible. For example, cross-examination regarding particular actions of the defendant which were gone into on direct is proper 86 (1971) (defendant replied, "I'll answer that partially;" could ask, "you don't want to answer it fully?"); People v. Johnson, 27 N.Y. 2d 119, 261 N.E.2d 644, 313 N.Y.S.2d 728, cert. denied, 401 U.S. 966 (1971) (defendant cannot limit cross with omissions in his direct testimony).
83 See, e.g., Tafero v. State, 223 So. 2d 564 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1969) . 84 See, e.g., United States v. Huff, 442 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1971) People v. Fields, 271 Cal. App. 2d 500, 76 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1969) (why does alibi witness remember that particular day so distinctly?); Salisbury v. State, 222 Ga. 549,150 S.E.2d 819 (1966) , (did alibiwitness tell her story to any law enforcement officers?); People v. Jordan, 38 Ill. 2d 83, 230 State v. Hale, 206 Kan. 521, 479 P.2d 902 (1971) (possession of stolen shotgun); State v. Penley, 277 N.C. 704, 178 S.E.2d 490 (1971) Chaffin v. State, 227 Ga. 327, 180 S.E.2d 741 (1971) (asked defendant's previous lawyer why the insanity defense was not used in the first trial); Tarrants v. State, 236 So. 2d 360 (Miss. 1970 ), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 920 (1971 (could examine all aspects of defendant's life); State v. Johnson, 69 Wash. 2d 264, 418 P.2d 238 (1966) (passive nature tied to insanity defense, could cross as to conviction for threatening wife's life). 93 See State v. Mayo, 487 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1972) (proper to cross on prior encounters with deceased, i.e., did defendant stab him in the abdomen on a prior occasion); Commonwealth v. James, 433 Pa. 508, 253 A.2d 97 (1969) (1966) , (cross to show increased money in defendant's possession after the crime is proper); Commonwealth v. Koch, 446 Pa. 469, 288 A.2d 791 (1972) People v. Williams, 26 Mich. App. 218, 182 N.W.2d 347 (1970) . But see Hunter v. State, 48 Ala. App. 232, 263 So. 2d 690 (1972) (attempt to refute claim that defendant did not know the murder rifle was in his car by repeatedly asking if defendant shot the rifle at a car a year before the fatal shooting was irrelevant and highly prejudicial); State v. Frese, 256 Iowa 289, 127 N.W.2d 83 (1964) (refuting claim that rape victim consented with guilty verdicts of co-defendants was collateral and improper).
7See, e.g., Davis v. State, 216 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1968 Colo. 234, 460 P.2d 784 (1969) (claimed he and his murdered wife had reconciled differences and were preparing to purchase a mobile home, cross to show improbability of that claim with questions showing bad debts and poor credit rating); People v. Scott, 82 Ill. App. 2d 109, 227 N.E.2d 72 (1967) (defendant claimed it was unbelievable that anyone could be raped in an elevator, properly crossed as to his prior conviction for a rape in an elevator); State v. Edwards, 435 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1968 ) (assertion that a confession was induced by police officers telling defendant that his wife would have nothing further to do with him if he As previously stated, the witness' credibility almost always is in issue.
00 Since cross-examination regarding previous criminal convictions is a major method of impeaching credibility, in that sense at least, questions regarding prior criminal activity are within the scope of the direct examination. When inquiry delving into past illegal conduct is warranted by affirmative testimony on the witness stand, however, the extent of that questioning is governed by the guidelines previously discussed in this section. That inquiry is frequently occasioned by the seemingly inexplicable denial on direct examination of prior criminal involvement for which there is a readily accessible recordFor whatever the reason, defendants and defense witnesses routinely and falsely deny arrests,°7 convictions 0 s and the commission of criminal acts in general. 10 9 A frequent claim is "I haven't been in did not confess was rebutted with questions showing divorce suit and support and alimony motions had been filed); State v. Miller, 258 S.C. 572, 190 S.E.2d 23 (1972) (defendant asserted he pled guilty every time he was properly charged and therefore was innocent of instant charge, crossed as to the penalty for armed robbery to show his reluctance to plead guilty because of the sentence he would receive, not because of innocence People v. Bey, 42 Ill. 2d 139, 246 N.E.2d 287 (1969) . See also State v. Miles, 492 P.2d 497 (Ore. 1972) (claimed no traffic convictions within last three years, crossed on driving while intoxicated, driving without a license, driving with a suspended license). (1971) (denied throwing add on a plate glass window, had done exactly that in a union dispute); People v. Doerr, 266 Cal. App. 2d 36, 71 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1968) (use of marijuana denied); Berlin v. State, 12 Md. App. 48, 277 A.2d 468 (1971) (claimed never sold drugs illegally before, had sold to a policeman); Commonwealth v. French, 357 Mass. 356, 259 N.E.2d 195 (1970) , vac. for resentencing, 408 U.S. 936 (1972) (denied loansharking); Commonwealth v. Bastone, 211 Pa. Super. 509, 239 A.2d 863 (1968) ('9 never robbed anyone in my life," crossed on four convictions); Hamilton v. State, 480 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. 1972 ) ('I never been inside a burglary before. I didn't know nothing about how to rob or nothing." Properly crossed as to other robberies where he was identified as a participant); Guillory v. State, 400 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1966) (claim that defendant never tried to take anyone's life, crossed on incident not resulting in a conviction where he struck a person with an iron pipe). But see People v . Jackson, 95 Ill. App. 2d 193, 238 N.E.2d able to refute these erroneous representations with questions based upon a record of prior criminal involvement, significant damage may be done to the defendant's case.
When reference is made on direct examination to prior criminal activity, the door is often opened to relevant and legitimate inquiry into that area on cross-examination."' This inquiry, however, is not as broad as is permitted when the witness (including the defendant) makes false representations or denials,"' and, therefore, often results in prejudicial questioning."' If the jurisdiction's limitations of scope are followed, however, the prosecutor may explore the general area of the criminal behavior" 4 as well as some details of a particular offense." 5 196 (1968) ("I don't carry a knife." Improper to cross on concealed weapons arrest without charge).
The denial must be in clear contradiction of the record. United States v. Vigo, 435 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1970 , cerl. denied, 403 U.S. 908 (1971) (defendant testified that she did not know anyone who was convicted of heroin charges who dealt with her co-defendant. Cross-examination regarding her husband's heroin conviction and friendship with her co-defendant was improper because there was no evidence that he dealt with the co-defendant); McKee v. State, 488 P.2d 1039 (Alas. 1971 (claim that defendant never stabbed or raped anyone was not contradicted by a threatened assault); People v. Matlock, 11 Cal. App. 3d 453, 89 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1970) ("I don't enjoy beating on one at no time" was not a denial of prior assaults. Cross on them was therefore error).
"' See State v. Lopez, 107 Ariz. 214, 484 P.2d 1045 1 'See, e.g., People v. Otkins, 114 fl1. App. 2d 439, 252 N.E.2d 906 (1969) . 1 See, e.g., People v. Parish, 6 Ill. App. 3d 587, 285 N.E.2d 606 (1972) ; People v. Hines, 87 Ill. App. 2d 283, 232 N.E.2d 111 (1967) .
"See Rogers v. United States, 411 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1969 ) (defendant mentioned jail stay, improper to cross about various jails and compare them); People v. Parish, 6 Ill. App. 3d 587, 285 N.E.2d 606 (1972) (defendant's brother testified that defendant was afraid of the police. Improper to extensively cross regarding convictions, specific acts and sentences); People v. Hines, 87 Ill. App. 2d 283, 232 N.E.2d 111 (1967) To terminate the discussion of the scope of cross-examination, a brief mention should be made of re-cross and further cross. Re-cross follows redirect examination and is limited to the explanation of new matters brought out on re-directU n It is of course subject to the judge's discretion." 7 Further cross is an extension of the original crossexamination. Subject to court discretion, a witness may be recalled and his examination continued?'
8
For example, a defendant might be re-called regarding an alibi defense which was testified to by a witness who followed the defendant's original examination.u n II F= AImNDMENT LIMITATIONS It is axiomatic that an accused who testifies on his own behalf is subject to cross-examination, and to some extent, therefore, waives his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination." 0 (This is 509 (1972) People v. Robinson, 386 Mich. 551, 194 N.W.2d 709 (1972) (testified he dealt in illicit guns, asked if he carried concealed weapons); State v. Baca, 81 N.M. 686, 472 P.2d 651 (1970) (asked about specific thefts); State v. McDaniel, 272 N.C. 556, 158 S.E.2d 874, rev'd 392 U.S. 665, a.'d, 274 N.C. 574, 164 S.E.2d 469 (1968) (asked about type of weapon used in prior assault); Commonwealth v. Flagg, 212 Pa. Super. 344, 242 A.2d 921 (1968) (asked about specific juvenile offenses); Harmon v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 442, 185 S.E.2d 48 (1971) (asked about what degree was the murder charge).
16See McCopmcx §32; LA. Rxv. STAT., ch. 15, §281 (1967) . Bt see State v. Warren, 271 So. 2d 527 (La. 1973 ) (although recross is limited to scope of redirect, no abuse in some leeway); State v. Giles, 253 La. 533, 218 So. 2d 585 (1969) (defendant subject to re-cross on entire case).
17 See People v. Daniels, 16 Cal. App. 3d 36, 93 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1971) ; State v. Harder, 3 N.C. App. 426, 165 S.E.2d 43 (1969 .
The waiver of the privilege is not suspended when the
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not true for an ordinary witness who does not cast aside the protection of the fifth amendment by the act of taking the witness stand.) What is quite unclear, however, is the breadth of that waiver. In this regard one must distinguish between the "scope of the direct" and the "waiver of the Fifth," for as Dean McCormick has explained, Clearly the two matters are not identical, and fundamentally different factors are involved in each. The scope of cross-examination is essentially a matter of control over the order of production of evidence; the primary policy being served is the orderly conduct of the trial. The waiver of the privilege, however, involves the extent to which an accused must forfeit the protection of the privilege to place his own version of the facts before the trier of fact."
This dicotomy is most acute in jurisdictions favoring the "wide open" rule of cross-examination. The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence for example, which provide for the "wide open" rule, make clear that they do not attempt to control the extent of an accused's waiver.lu In the absence of clear constitutional guidelines provided by Supreme Court litigation, the various jurisdictions use their formulations of permissible scope as a standard or gauge by which the fifth amendment waiver can be judged.
The fifth amendment has been deemed waived consistent with the scope of the direct examination accused temporarily leaves the witness stand. See State v. Coty, 229 A.2d 205 (Me. 1967) .
The defendant is not subject to cross-examination by having made unsworn statements. See Smith v. State, 124 Ga. App. 510, 184 S.E.2d 225 (1971) ; Wright v. State, 113 Ga. App. 436, 148 S.E.2d 333 (1966) ; Shoffeitt v. State, 107 Ga. App. 217, 129 S.E.2d 572 (1963) . But see Redfield v. United States, 315 F.2d 76 (9th Cir. 1963 ) (defendant acting as own counsel, made continued unsworn statements in spite of fifth amendment warning by the judge, who eventually asked a few questions while the defendant was examining a witness).
A defendant may be subjected to cross if he performs a demonstration of some sort before the jury. See Machin v. State, 213 So. 2d 499 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla.) , cert. denied, 221 So. 2d 747 (1968) (running to demonstrate lack of a limp which the guilty party was supposed to have). At least one court has ruled that if the defendant is unrepresented by counsel, an instruction about the waiver of the fifth amendment or taking the stand does not serve as a waiver. See People v. Glaser, 238 Cal. App. 2d 819, 48 Cal. Rptr. 427, cert. denied by some courts,sa sometimes with language advising caution by the prosecutor 2 4 Other courts have taken the position that the waiver is quite broad" 5 and may include "whatever has legitimate bearing upon the question of guilt," 126 or "all matters pertaining to the prosecution." '' Most frequently, however, courts construe the waiver as including all matters relevant toP related to, 1 2 or within the extent of the direct examination.:" The waiver may be significantly extended, therefore by a general denial of guilt.
18 ' There is scant case law on the question of whether a waiver necessarily must extend to all counts of a multi-count indictment, but the few cases on point indicate that the answer is in the affirmative 32 This holding has been severely criticized by commentators in light of the fact that if the counts were severed, the defendant would have the option of testifying at each particular trial."
It is well settled that a prosecutor may not crossexamine the accused regarding his silence at the time of the arrest or his request for the assistance of counsel.i 34 Nevertheless, there are avenues of inquiry in this area which can be explored under the proper circumstances. The courts have defined a legal "twilight zone" where the accused's right to silence merges with an obligation to give the police the explanation that he offers to the jury at trial."' 5 The theory here, is that if the defendant tells the court that he found burglary proceeds on the ground and was arrested while on his way to deliver them to the police, it is reasonable to ask why he didn't say that to the arresting officers." 6 Although there is authority to the contrary, People v. Williams, 26 Mich. App. 218, 182 N.W.2d 347 (1970) ; State v. Hovey, 80 N.M. 373, 456 P.2d 206 (1966) (no error since guilt not inferred from the question which was unrelated to details of the crime); People v. Finney, 39 N.Y.2d 749, 332 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1972) ; State v. Young, 27 Ohio St. 2d 310, 272 N.E.2d 353 (1971) , vac. for resentencing, 408 U.S. 940 (1972) .
" 5 See Johnson v. People, 172 Colo. 406, 473 P.2d 974 (1970) hold that when a defendant presents a detailed exculpatory explanation"' or alibi 3 at trial, it is a proper test of the story's credibility to question if that story had ever been offered previously. Occasionally, the door will be opened to this inquiry by the defendant on direct examination broaching the subject of his prior silence. 140 Questions of an 45, 97 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1970) 
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alibi witness regarding his prior silence do not raise the fifth amendment issue' (unless of course the answer would expose him to a criminal prosecution).,-It is violative of the fifth amendment and therefore improper to question a defendant regarding his silence at an earlier trial,4' at the trial of a co-defendant T 4 in a preliminary hearing, 14 ' or before a grand jury."' Similarly, inquiry into an earlier guilty plea to the instant charge is not allowed. 47 Questions which may expose the defendant to additional criminal charges may be asked if the subject matter falls within the initial fifth amendment waiver."' If the defendant does legitimately invoke the fifth amendment during the course of cross-examination, the prosecutor should be careful not to draw improper, adverse inferences from the assertion of the privilege.
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Davidson, 457 S.W.2d 674 (Mo. 1970 ) (claim that he was not allowed to tell his story to the police and refused to sign a statement afterwards).
" 'People v. McCorry, 51 Ill. 2d 343, 282 N.E.2d 425 (1972) Dean v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 666, 166 S.E.2d 228 (1969) . Bit see Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926) ; Funderbunk v. State, 12 Md. App. 481, 280 A.2d 4 (1971) .
14" See, e.g., People v. Jordan, 7 Mich. App. 28, 151 N.W.2d 242 (1967) State v. Boscia, 93 N.J. Super. 586, 226 A.2d 643 (1967) ; People v. Leo, 23 N.Y.2d 556, 245 N.E.2d 705, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969) .
147 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Henderson, 217 Pa. Super. 329, 272 A.2d 267 (1970) .
" '3 See People v. Harris, 18 Cal. App. 3d 1, 95 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1971) (forgery); State v. Hemphill, 460 S.W.2d 648 (Mo. 1970 ) (concealed weapons charges); State v. Anderson, 27 Utah 276, 495 P.2d 804 (1972) . But see Johnson v . United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943) (privilege applicable); UTAH CODE AN. §78-24-9 (1953) ("... he need not give an answer which will have a tendency to subject him to punishment for a felony .... "). The privilege is not available to a defendant who fears incriminating a co-defendant, State v. Jesser, 95 Idaho 43, 501 P.2d 727 (1972) As mentioned previously,"" a defendant (or a witness) on direct examination may authorize inquiry into limited areas of his character by representing himself in a particular light"' For example, he may testify to his reputation for peace and quiet and be cross-examined to refute that assertion. 1 Questions which explore the defendant's specific character for truth and veracity are governed by the rules of scope or by legislation." 3 If it has not been put in issue, however, the prosecutor should cautiously avoid the villification of an accused's general character, for the courts will no longer entertain a quest for "the villain of the piece." -4 In addition to offering evidence of his good character while on the witness stand himself, a defendant may choose to call upon a character witness to testify to his noteworthy reputation in the community. Although the presentation of a character witness may lead to particularly devastating crossexamination, this type of witness is called to the stand with great regularity. It has been said that character evidence alone may raise a reasonable doubt of guilt,
15
' and apparently this feeling is cert. denied, 402 U.S. 950 (1971) (1967) .
15 See PROPOSU FED. R. Evm. 608(a) which provides: "The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of reputation or opinion, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness." The comment following the rule recognizes cross-examination of this nature as being recognized by the bulk of judicial authority). Similarly, CAL. Evm. CoDE- §786 (West 1966) on a defendant's character to question his homosexual activities). As with other areas of cross-examination, the courts exercise a broad power of discretion. United States v. Battaglia, 394 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1968) , cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971) .
115See, e.g., Edgington v. United States, 164 U.S.
(1896).
shared by many experienced members of the criminal bar.' 56 When a witness is called to testify that the accused has a reputation for peacefulness, honesty, or other qualities of character which are inconsistent with the conduct that is charged, the witness may be broadly cross-examined"' in order to discredit his reliability. 1 " This cross-examination provides a vehicle by which negative information concerning the defendant's background, which would not otherwise be admissible, may be laid before the trier of fact.
59
The cross-examination of a character witness delves into his familiarity with the defendant's reputation 62 and may focus either on his sources of information, or the frequency with which he discussed the issue. State v. Elliot, 25 Ohio St. 2d 249, 267 N.E.2d 806 (1971) , vacated for resentencing, 408 U.S. 939 (1972) ; Commonwealth v. Little, 295 A.2d 287 (Pa. 1972) ; Brown v. State, 477 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. 1972 415 (1966) (but reversible to ask inaccurate hypothetical question and not allow an explanation by the witness); People v. Stedman, 41 Mich. App. 393, 200 N.W.2d 370 (1972) ; Carter v. State, 84 Nev. 592, 446 P.2d 165 (1968) ; State v. Elliot, 25 Ohio St.2d 249, 267 N.E.2d 806 (1971) , vacated for resentencing, 408 U.S. 939 (1972) . But see United States v. Rudolph, 403 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1968 ) (prejudicial to cross on an unrelated crime, a murder plot, no relevance to guilt or innocence of crime charged); People v. Hunt, 132 Ill. App. 2d 314, 270 N.E.2d 243 (1971) (prejudicial to ask if witnesses knew defendant carried a blackjack); People v. Meyers, 94 Ill. App. 2d 340, 236 N.E.2d 786 (1968) (improper to ask about specific acts, but no error since already brought out by accused on direct). See also the rule in State v. Smith, 5 N.C. App. 635, 169 S.E.2d 4 (1969) (cannot ask about specific bad acts unless admitted by the defendant on direct).
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16 See e.g., Smith v. State, 411 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. 1967) . The character witness may be questioned regarding his knowledge that the person upon whose reputation he has reported has been accusedr2 arrested' " or convicted of a crimePl While there is some authority which supports the view that minor offenses such as traffic violations 7 5 should not be mentioned, juvenile offenses appear to be proper subjects of inquiry in a few jurisdictions' 7 There is no limitation concerning the remoteness of any 389 U.S. 998 (1967) of these occurrences, provided the witness was acquainted with the accused at that time.Y' It would appear that when dealing with a matter of record such as an arrest or a conviction, the cross-examiner should be permitted to use the 'Do you know?" form of the question.lw The Michelson guideline, however, has had such widespread influence, that most of the reported cases reflect the use of the "Have you heard?" form even when dealing with factual realities such as these.'P' If a character witness has answered that he has not heard the negative rumors which may have circulated, or the reports of criminal arrests or convictions, the jury may conclude that the witness is not sufficiently qualified to testify about the accused's reputation. If the witness has admitted knowledge of these things, but still was willing to speak favorably of the defendant's reputation, the jury is then free to consider what sort of standards the witness has applied. This is brought into focus for the jurors by the very effective technique (in those jurisdictions which permit it) of asking the witness at the end of his examination, now that he has heard these things is his opinion still the same, or in the alternative, if he had considered these matters before, what would his opinion have been. 80 The wit- 
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ness may therefore be put in the position of either withdrawing his earlier testimony or dearly demonstrating to the jury that he-attributes little importance to the unattractive behavior that has been discussed, in which case the weight of his opinion is therefore reduced.'P The cross-examination of character witnesses obviously entails the possibility of significant prejudice to the defendant's case. The prosecutor, therefore, must cautiously avoid unduly emphasizing the negative material with which he is dealing, for the courts are quick to remind him that this mode of cross-examination is meant to attack the witness and not the accused.m Additionally, he is held to a very strict standard of good faith.P The questions he propounds to the witness 1752, 434 P.2d 316 (1967) must be founded either in fact or upon reasonable belief. Random inquiries are not tolerated by the courts 185 To avoid this possibility, the courts have increasingly begun to undertake judicial examinations of the proposed questions before they-are aired before the jury' 8 6 In this way, unsubstantiated charges and inherently prejudicial material can be screened and kept from the ears of the jurors.
IV. ExxaRT WiTmssxs
The permissible limits of prosecutorial crossexamination are quite broad when dealing with an expert witness.'l As one court has said, 1 85 See, e.g. People v State v. Hinton, 206 Kan. 500, 479 P.2d 910 (1971) . The court in State v. Steensen, 113 A.2d 203, 206 (N.J. 1955 ) laid out the following guidelines for the preliminary inquiry into the questions to be asked of a character witness. The court advised that the judge satisfy himself:
(1) That there is no question as to the fact of the subject matter of the rumor, that is, of-the previous arrests, conviction, or other pertinent" misconduct of the defendant; (2) That a reasonable likelihood exists that the previous arrest, conviction or other pertinent misconduct would have been bruited about the neighborhood or commission of the offense on trial; (3) That neither the event or conduct nor the rumor concerning it occurred at a time too remote from the present offense; (4) That the earlier event or misconduct and the rumor concerned the specific trait involved in the offense for which the accused is on trial; and (5) That the examination will be conducted in the proper form, that is: Have you heard', etc. not 'Do you know,' etc. The court added that "if the conclusion is reached to allow the interrogation, the jury should be informed of its exact purpose either at the conclusion thereof or in the charge." 113 A. 2d Once an expert offers his opinion, however, he exposes himself to the kind of inquiry which ordinarily would have no place in the crossexamination of a factual witness. The expert invites investigation into the extent of his knowledge, the reasons for his opinion including facts and other matters upon which it is based and which he took into consideration; and he may be subjected to the most rigid cross-examination concerning his qualifications, and his opinion and its sources. '3 Experts are properly cross-examined regarding their educational background and professional qualifications,"1 9 their experience, 19 as well as the possible existence of a special interest in the outcome of the case. Inquiries into financial remuneration"' as well as bias towards a particular defendant l 2 or type of case" 9 are properly made.
A major portion of an expert's cross-examination is directed towards questioning the grounds for his opinion. In this regard, the prosecutor may inquire as to the facts that were relied upon to reach the witness' ultimate conclusion. People v. Jones, 225 Cal. App. 2d 598, 37 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1964) .
"'9See CALsp. EvID. CODE §721(a)(1) (West 1966) ; Simpson v. State, 32 Wis. 2d 195, 145 N.W.2d 206 (1966) , cert. denied, 386 U.S. 969 (1967) . goSee e.g., State v. Vennard, 159 Conn. 385, 270 A.2d 83 (1970) , cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1011 (1971) (psychiatrist asked if she ever examined a person accused of a crime before).
"'See CAIS . Evm. CODE §722(b) (West 1966 (1967) (could cross a medical witness as to whether defendant's calling the sheriff and saying he would surrender to the sheriff but not to a city policeman indicates that he knew he had done something wrong); People v. Nye, 78 Cal. Rptr. 467, 455 P.2d 395 (1969) (defendant's testimony at first trial used on cross of expert to show conflict and possible lying); People v. Whitmore, 251 Cal. App. 2d 359, 59 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1967) ; Tarrants v. State, 236 So. 2d 360 (Miss. 1970) , cert. denied, 401 U.S. 920 (1971) (could examine all aspects of defendant's life); State v. Turner, 81 N.M. 571, 469 P.2d 720 (1970) (if considered by expert, proper to ask about defendant's admission of two assaults, a rape and two burglaries). But see Hurt v. State, 480 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. 1972) (questions regarding thirteen prior criminal acts constituted reversible error, psychiatrist could not be crossed like a character witness).
Inquiry as to a defendant's statements is improper pursuant to ALAS. STAT. §12.45.100 (1972) which provides: No statement made by the accused in the course of an examination into his sanity or mental capacity ... may be admitted into evidence against the accused on the issue of guilt in a criminal proceeding.
" ' See People v. Jones, 225 Cal. App. 2d 598, 37 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1964) (history of sexual offenses); Simpson v. State, 32 Wis. 2d 195, 145 N.W.2d 206 (1966) , cert. denied, 386 U.S. 965 (1967) .
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the defendant, whether he performed psychological tests, and whether he bases his opinion mainly on the reports of others.
200 Additionally, the psychiatrist may be asked questions going to the heart of the insanity defense, i.e., is the defendant faking?
2 "' Where an expert witness has first hand information, as where a forensic pathologist has examined a body to determine the cause of death, or where a psychiatrist has personally examined the defendant, specific questions may be asked about his opinions. Where, however, the expert is lacking first hand information but his opinion is nevertheless desired or even if he has first hand information but is being asked to speculate about the possibility of certain facts changing his testimony, the prosecutor may tender hypothetical questions. In this regard, the courts exercise a broad discretionary power. 2 m Some courts will permit the asking of hypothetical questions which are based on facts not in evidence, 2 0 and the offer of a prosecutor to prove up any fact which the expert testifies would change his opinion may increase the likelihood of acceptance.G 4 Virtually all courts, to some extent, allow the use of treatises in the cross-examination of expert witnesses°5 The majority view is that an expert may be cross-examined with a treatise if he has relied upon that particular work in reaching his opinion, if he recognizes it as authoritative in the field, or if 200 See, e.g., United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1971 ; Brown v. State, 45 Ala. App. 391, 231 So. 2d 167 (1970) (question-did you ask him whether or not he had been convicted of a penitentiary offense?).
201 See People v. Bandhauer, 83 Cal. Rptr. 184, 463 P.2d 408 (1970) (proper to ask doctor if he knew that defendant had seen numerous other "knowledgeable" prisoners and therefore simply that his symptoms might be faked); Bateman v. State, 10 Md. App. 630, 272 A.2d 64 (1971) ("Doctor, if I tell you this case was originally set for trial in February and the insanity plea was not filed until after the case was originally set for trial, would that indicate perhaps this insanity is a newly made up idea?" Here it was proper to demonstrate that the accused had no history of mental disease and made no effort to seek treatment until the case was set for trial. Additionally, the defendant's amnesia symptom was incongruous with normal medical standards). 2 the work itself has been admitted into evidence. 2 0 6 The very liberal minority view permits this examination if the examiner merely is able to establish the authenticity of the work by evidence or judicial notice.
207
The hearsay objection that is offered in connection with learned treatise examination, is also raised with regard to cross-examination using reports of other experts or hospital records. These objections are untenable if the expert has himself relied on these sources to reach his conclusions. 2 1 The final point should be made that an expert witness appointed by the court is subject to normal cross-examination by both the prosecution and the defense. 
COURT ITSELF
It can be categorically asserted that witnesses may be called to stand by the court itself. 2 0 9 It is equally clear that court witnesses are subject to cross-examination by counsel for both sides. This modification of the confrontation principle is sup- If a witness testifying as an expert testifies in the form of an opinion, he may not be cross-examined in regard to the content or tenor of any scientific, technical, or professional test, treatise, journal, or similar publication unless: (1) The witness referred to, considered, or relied upon such publication in arriving at or forming his opinion; or (2) such publication has been admitted in evidence. 217 See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill. 2d 326, N.E. 2d 253 (1965 1027 (Wyo. 1972 . It also is proper to use the reports of the prosecution expert. See State v. Risden, 106 N.J. 226,264 A. 2d 214 (1970) . If the witness' report is used to impeach him, it is error not to introduce the entire report. See People v. Plummer, 37 Mich. App. 657,195 N.W.2d 328 (1972) . 209 Cir. ), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1053 (the court properly called a witness at the prosecutor's request, so that he could be cross-examined as to intimidation attempts by the defendant). But it is improper to call a court witness so the prosecutor can extensively crossexamine him on the basis of prior statements under the guise of impeachment. People v. McKee, 39 Ill. 2d 265 , cert denied, 404 U.S. 1053 (1972) ; Sutton v. State, 239 So.2d 664 (Fla. 1970 ); People v. Marino, 44 Ill. 2d 562, N.E.2d 770 (1970) . But see People v. Kimbrough, 131 Ill. App. 2d 36, 266 N.E.2d 431 (1970) , where the court held that cross-examination must be limited to direct issues, and that collateral matters cannot be raised- rule was based upon the principle that the calling party vouched for the credibility of his witness, and therefore should not attack that credibility. Recently, however, this theory has come under severe criticism because witnesses may not chosen by the application of strict screening standards.
217
For this reason, there has been a recent move away from the common law position. Some legislation, including the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, now provides that either party may impeach any witness on the stand. 28 Similarly, a small body of case law supports the modem position. 19 Although the impeachment may be on the grounds of bias, interest, or character,"° it typically is in the form of an attack based upon a prior inconsistent statement. 2 1 The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence may be expected to give significant impetus to the movement towards more liberal impeachment. In the meantime, the majority view is that one's own witness may be impeached only if the calling party has been surprised and his case damaged. (West 1966) ; Iur. REv. SmrT., ch. 110, §60 (1971) ; KA. STAT. ANN. §60-420 (1964) . The liberal hearsay provisions of the proposed federal rules have given rise to §806, which reads in part: "If the party against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the decarant as a witness, the party is entitled to examine him on the statement as if under crossexamination." PRoPosED FED. R. EviD. 806.
Evm. CODE 785
219 See State v. Micheal, 103 Ariz. 46, 436 P.2d 595 (1968 ), aff'd, 107 Ariz. 126, 483 P.2d 541 (1971 ; People v. Freeman, 20 Cal. App. 3d 488, 97 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1971) ; State v. Gardner, 2 Ore. App. 265, 467 P.2d 125 (1970) ; People v. Chacon, 73 Cal. Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 106 (1968) ; State v. Scott, 502 P.2d 753 (Kan. 1972) ; State v. Armstrong, 207 Kan. 681, 486 P.2d 1322 ; State v. Harden, 206 Kan. 365, 480 P.2d 53 (1971) ; State v. Franklin, 206 Kan. 527, 479 P. 2d 848 (1971) ; Barger v. State, 2 Md. App. 565, 235 A.2d 752 (1967) ; State v. Fronning, 186 Neb. 463, 183 N.W. 2d 920 (1971) ; State v. Williams, 12 N.C. App. 161, 182 S.E.2d 592 (1971 ), cert. denied, 279 N.C. 514,183 S.E.2d 691 (1971 .
22 See McCosmcK §38; State v. Harden, 206 Kan. 365, 480 P.2d 53 (1971) ; State v. Franklin, 206 Kan. 527, 479 P.2d 848 (1971) ; Barger v. State, 2 Md. App. 565, 235 A.2d 752 (1967) . 221 Vol. 65 surprise must constitute more than a minor change in the recited facts.2m Also, surprise may not be claimed if the prosecutor has had as little as fifteen minutes warning that the witness would not testify as originally expected. 4 The damage must be real and substantial, rather than just the failure to give evidence helpful to the prosecution's case. For example, innocuous statements or claims of "I don't know" or I don't remember" do not constitute sufficient damage.m These limitations are based on 384 U.S. 921 (1966) Pa. 491, 252 A.2d 378 (1969) . The judge may allow the prosecutor to examine the witness outside the presence of the jury to demonstrate surprise. (State v. Robertson, 102 R.I. 623, 232 A.2d 781 (1967) State v. Green, 71 Wash. 2d 372, 428 P.2d 540 (1967) . But see Gaitan v. People, 167 Colo. 395, 447 P.2d 1001 , here prosecutor avoided questioning the witness in an in camera proceeding to prevent foreknowledge because he was afraid she would change her testimony. He was still allowed to claim surprise at trial but the court evidenced some disapproval. 881 (1971) , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 866 (1972) ; Zanders v. State, 480 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. 1972) . In United States v. WMngola, 424 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1970) , impeachment was allowed when a witness who previously had said that he stole checks for the deendant, testified in court that they never had conversations about dealings in stolen checks. Bid see United States v. Washabaugh, 442 F.2d 1127 (9th , where a witness who claimed lack of memory could be impeached.
the theory that the only reason for the impeachment of one's own witness is to remove the adverse effects of his unexpected testimony. 2 6 While courts frequently use the term "hostile witness" to refer to a witness who has given surprising and damaging testimony to the party who called him,.2 the term also refers to a witness who may be evasive, unwilling, or recalcitrant. 228 In those situations, judges in some jurisdictions, by the exercise of their discretion, may allow the calling party to cross-examine the witness.
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VII IMPEACMENT BY PMOR INCONSISTENT STATeMeNTS
When the person on the witness stand, whether he is a defense witness, a prosecution witness, a court witness, or the defendant himself, testifies to facts which are inconsistent with assertions he has made at an earlier time, that person's credibility may be impeached through cross-examination based upon his prior inconsistent statements. 316 (5th Cir. 1968) , where a 15 year old government witness in a prosecution for transport of a minor for prostitution was properly asked leading questions because of her upset and nervous condition. 230 See, e.g., United States v. Washabaugh, 442 F.2d
though under the modem view, prior inconsistent statements under certain circumstances may be an exception to the hearsay rule and admissible as substantive evidence, 2 3 ' that matter is outside the scope of this article. For presentpurposes, prior inconsistent statements will be discussed not as a method of proving that a particular fact or statement is true but rather as a method of showing that the witness who materially changes his story is generally unworthy of belief (The majority view limits this type of examination for the latter purpose 32 and requires that the jury be given a limiting instruction. 2 3 3 ).
Prior inconsistent statements may have been given to the prosecutor himself, 2 ' Smith v. Reinckie, 354 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1965 ); People v. Luna, 37 Ill.2d 299, 226 N.E.2d 586 (1967) ; People v. Svizzero, 84 Ill. App. 2d 251; 228 N.E.2d 604 (1967) ; Stutzman v. State, 250 Ind. 467, 235 N.E.2d 186 (1968) ; State v. Nobles, 14 N.C. App. 340,188 S.E.2d 600 (1972) . 3 See Colber t v. State, 124 Ga. App. 283, 183 S.E.2d 476 (1971) ; Minor v. State, 6 Md. App. 82, 250 A.2d 113 (1969) .
234 See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) ; United States v. Caruso, 465 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1972 ; United States v. Lopez, 355 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1966) , cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1013 (1966) ; State v. Lancaster, 25 Ohio St. 2d 83, 267 N.E.2d 291 (1971 See, e.g., United States v. Mayersohn, 413 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1969 ), aff'd, 452 F.2d 521 (1971 (probation report compiled before defendant withdrew his guilty plea); People v. Alesi, 67 Cal.2d 856, 434 P.2d 360, 64 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1967) (statements given in rehabilitation center on advice of counsel). But see People v. Harrington, 2 Cal. 3d 991, 471 P.2d 961, 88 Cal Rptr. 161 (1970) (where admission to probation officer without advice of counsel were not sufficiently reliable for impeachment purposes). As with most other areas of cross-examination, the trial judge exercises a broad discretionary power over impeachment based upon prior inconsistent statements. That discretion must be invoked to determine whether there is a sufficient discrepancy between the present testimony and the prior statement to warrant the impeachment of the witness. While it does not require a Solomon to recognize the discrepancies in the testimony of a witness who in court says that A killed B, but when in the grand jury room said that C killed B, less obvious inconsistencies defy categorization and in-:wSee, e.g., People v. Acosta, 18 Cal. App. 3d 895, 96 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1971) . But see note 198 supra. '3' See, e.g., United States v. Guglielmini, 425 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1970); Collaher v. United States, 419 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1969 ), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969 ; United States v. Budzanoski, 331 F. Supp. 1201 (W.D. Pa. 1973 ), aff'd, 462 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1972 . But see State v. Terrebone, 256 La. 385,236 So. 2d 773 (1970) (grand jury secrecy cannot be violated for impeachment purposes). 2 1 9 United States ex rel. Musil v. Pate, 427 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1970 ), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971 ; People v. Byers, 50 DI1. 2d 210, 278 N.E.2d 65 (1972) ; State v. Jacques 296 A.2d 246 (Vt. 1972) .
24 'See, State v. Kramer, 72 Wash. 2d 904, 435 P.2d 970 (1967) . Contra Commonwealth v. Rasom, 446 Pa. 457, 288 A.2d 762 (1972) .
241 See, e.g., Keener v. State, 456 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. 1970) ; Griffin v. State, 455 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1970 See, e.g., United States v. Cantome, 426 F.2d 902 (2d Cir.) , cert. denied 400 U.S. 827 (1970); Smith v. United States, 312 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1962 ), aJI'd, 332 F.2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1964 ; Moore v. Beto, 320 F. Supp. 469 (S.D. Tex. 1970) .
213 See, e.g., Woody v. United States, 379 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 961 (1967) ; Humphrey v. United States, 236 A.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Commonwealth v. Raveneil, 448 Pa. 162, 292 A.2d 365 (1972) .
24For example, a newspaper article may be the source of a prior inconsistent statement. See United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971) (defense counsel was able to cross-examine a witness based upon a newspaper interview wherein the witness claimed that the defendant appeared to be high on LSD); Pallota v. United States, 404 F.2d 1035 (1st Cir. 1968 ), rev''d on other grounds, 443 F.2d 594 (1st Cir. 1970 ) (counsel could impeach a witness where the witness had given a different newspaper account). A statement not adopted by the witness may not be used to impeach. See Lawrence v. United States, 357 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1966) .
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vite judicial discretion.? Generally speaking, if the witness omits a material fact which he should not reasonably have done,u 6 or if he alters a material fact in his testimony, he is subject to confrontation with his prior statement. A stricter standard may be applied by some courts when the person to be impeached is the defendant.sa Whether or not a lay witness may be impeached by a prior inconsistent opinion, will also depend upon the view of the jurisdiction, but commentators have suggested that the answer should be in the affirmative.?
9
The foundation requirements for prior inconsistent statement impeachment stem from an 1820 English opinion, Queen Caroline's Case.no A portion of that opinion reads, If it be intended to bring the credit of a witness into question by proof of anything he may have said or declared touching the cause, the witness is first asked, upon cross-examination, whether or not he has said or declared that which is intended to be proved.nl That requirement of asking the witness if he made the statement has been carried down through the years and expanded. Currently, the majority view requires that the witness be told the date, time, place, substance of, and person to whom the statement was made. 52 831 (Tex. 1972) .
246 See State v. Mack, 282 N.C. 334, 193 S.E.2d 71 (1972) . In State v. Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 422 P.2d 581 (1967 ), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967 , the court specifically rejected the vo untay-ivoluntrnistinction as being irrelevant. See also State v. Paul, 83 N.M. 619, 495 P.2d 797 (1972) . 2 4 McCopMcx §34. But the prosecutor can't force the issue. A prosecutor who pushes the witness to obtain a contradiction may cause a reversal. See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 104 Cal. Rptr. 350, 501 P.2d 918 (1972) , where the witness denied possessing narcotics which had been found in an illegal search fell prey to the prosecutor who continually and improperly raised the issue. Proper impeachment would have required that the witness/defendant make the denial on his own. Accord People v. Schwartz, 30 App. Div. 2d 385, 292 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1968) .
218 United States ex. rel. Dixon v. Cavell, 284 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Pa. 1968 ) (a defendant must deny more than elements of the crime); Commonwealth v. Burkett, 211 Pa. Super. 299, 235 A.2d 161 (1967) , a.ffd, 215 Pa. Super. 733, 256 A.2d 138 (1969) (more pinpointed inconsistency needed than the mere denial of elements of the crime). 250 See 2 Brod. & Bing 284, 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (1820) . 251 Id. at 313.
Harris, 441 F.2d 1333 (10th ; Gill v. Turner, freshed, the witness must then be given the opportunity to explain away or deny the statement.P A witness who claims that he does not know or cannot remember if he made the statement does not thereby escape impeachment.P Having properly laid the required foundation, the prosecutor may introduce the prior statement into evidence at his next opportunity to offer evidence."'
The rigid requirements of a proper foundation have been relaxed in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, through the abolition of the rule of 443 F.2d 1064 443 F.2d (10th Cir. 1971 ; United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971) ; Troublefield v. United States, 372 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir. 1967) Thomas v. United States, 363 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1966) ; Edwards v. State, 279 Ala. 371, 185 So. 2d 513 (1971) ; Thigpen v. State, 49 Ala. App. 233, 270 So. 2d 666 (1971 ) 209 So. 2d 896 (1968 ; State v. Miller, 16 Ariz. App. 92, 491 P.2d 481 (1971) ; People v. Brown, 6 III. App. 3d 500, 285 N.E.2d 515 (1972) ; People v. Rodgers, 36 Mich. App. 211, 193 N.W.2d 412 (1971) ; Hooks v. State, 197 So. 2d 238 (Miss. 1967) ; Bullock v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 809, 193 N.W.2d 889 (1972) . No foundation needs to be laid if the subject matter of the statement is material to the pending inquiry. See State v. Mack. 282 N.C. 334, 193 S.E.2d 71 (1972) . There are cases which hold that it is improper to lay the foundation for impeachment and not follow it up with proof of the inconsistent statement. See, e.g., United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971) ; People v. Williams, 105 Ill. App. 2d 25, 245 N.E.2d 17 (1969) . It is improper to ask each question of a lengthy prior statement. See, e.g., People v. Bacon, 2 Ill. App. 3d 324, 276 N.E.2d 782 (1971) (77 for one witness, 98 for another), But see State v. Walker, 148 Mont. 216,419 P.2d 300 (1966) Commonwealth v. Dennison, 441 Pa. 334, 272 A.2d 180 (1971) . The prosecutor need produce the person to whom the prior statement was made; United States v. Caruso, 465 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1972 ; Pedersen v. State, 420 P.2d 327 (Alas. 1966) ; nor does the fact that the defendant wasn't present when a witness made a prior statement preclude its use, State v. Covington, 432 S.W.2d 267 (Mo. 1968 State v. Miles, 73 Wash. 2d 67, 436 P.2d 198 (1968) . Contra People v. Sam, 454 P.2d 700, 77 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1969) . People v. Forgash, 38 Mich. App. 474, 196 N.W.2d 873 (1972) . 255 See McCopMcK §37, PxoposED FED. R. Evm.
(b).
JEREMY MARGOLIS
Queen Caroline's Case. 2 1 6 Under the proposed rules, therefore, the statement need not be shown to the witness, but it must be shown to opposing counsel upon his request. This is to avoid the allegation that a nonexistent statement has been fabricated.
The prosecutor is held to a good faith standard, and, therefore, asking a witness if he has made prior inconsistent statements when there is no reason to believe that he did so has been criticized as improper. 2 s Prosecutors have also encountered criticism when they have attempted to play for the witness (and thus, for the jury) a prior statement recorded on tape. This has led to a number of reversed convictions. 2 See State v. Gonya, 107 R.I. 594, 268 A.2d 729 (1970) (error although tapes garbled, no transcript made available); Weaver v. State, 446 P.2d 69 (Okla. 1968 ) (no cautionary instruction). But see People v. Wheeler, 23 Cal. App. 3d 290, 100 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1971) (jurisdiction allows use as substantive evidence).
259 This was done United States v. McKeever, 271 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1959) .
260 See, e.g., Beavers v. State, 492 P.2d 88 (Alaska 1971) ; Commonwealth v. Wilson. 431 Pa. 21, 244 A.2d 734 (1969 ), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1102 . See also Pallota v. United States, 404 F.2d 1035 (1st Cir. 1968 ) (newspaper article); State v. Carleton, 82 N.M. 537, 484 P.2d 757 (1971) (uncertified, unauthenticated notes) . However, the use of a letter written by the defendant to his wife was improper and violative of the marital privilege. See McCravey v. State, 455 S.W.2d 174 (Tenn. 1970 occasion. The pending charges were unrelated to this prior seizure and therefore the illegally seized evidence did not tend to prove guilt; it only tended to show the defendant's unreliability. The Supreme Court, finding that this impeachment was proper, wrote,
The defendant went beyond a mere denial of complicity in the crimes of which he was charged and made the broad sweeping claim that he had never dealt in or possessed any narcotics.... He must be free to deny all the elements of the case against him without thereby giving leave to the Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence illegally seized by it, and therefore not available for its case in chief. Beyond that, however, there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility.
22
In the landmark case of Harris v. New York, 2 M 2 Vol. 65
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the court expanded the Walder principle to apply to statements which are inadmissible as substantive evidence because of deficiencies in the Miranda requirements. In Harris, a defendant charged with the sale of heroin to an undercover policeman took the witness stand and admitted selling a substance, but he claimed it was baking powder. He then was impeached with contradictory statements he made to the police following his arrest. These statements were inadmissible in the case in chief due to the lack of a showing in the record that the accused was given his Miranda warnings. The Supreme Court held, however, that they were useable for impeachment purposes because, Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuseto do so. But that privilege cannot be construed to indude the right to commit perjury.... Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution here did no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process. Had inconsistent statements been made by the accused to some third person, it could hardly be contended that the conflict could not be laid before the jury by way of cross-examination and impeachment.
The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances. We hold, therefore, that petitioner's credibility was appropriately impeached by use of his earlier conflicting statements. 2 5 The court in Harris required, of course, that the statements used for impeachment be trustworthy in that they must be free from coercion, 2 6 495 (Okla. 1972) . In Commonwealth v. Wright, 415 Pa. 55, 202 A.2d 79 (1964 , rev'd 444 Pa. 588, 282 A.2d 266 (1971 , the Pennsylvania supreme court stated the conditions which it felt must be present in order to impeach with illegally seized evidence. These are: (1) the defendant must elect to take the stand; (2) the testimony which conflicts must be more than a denial of the elements of the crime; (c) the inadmissible evidence can be received only to the extent that it does not admit the acts which are the essential elements of the crime charged. See also Commonwealth v. Reginelli, VIII IMI'EACIIMENT BY CONVICTION OF CRIME At common law, a person who had been previously convicted of treason, a felony, or a misdemeanor involving dishonesty was rendered incompetent to testify as a witness in any judicial proceeding m While the belief that a criminal record reduces the trustworthiness of a person's testimony has remained ingrained in the law, the policy of holding such a person incompetent to testify has been rejected by both statutes and decisions.V 2 At the present time, therefore, the vast majority of jurisdictions allow the prosecutor to cross-examine defendants and defense witnesses regarding prior criminal records for the purpose of impeaching their credibility.P Exceptions to this practice include Kansas and Pennsylvania, where inquiry into the criminal record of the accused is allowed only after he has put his character in issue.n 4 208 Pa. Super. 344, 222 A.2d 605 (1966) , cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967) Pa. Super. 250, 242 A.2d 683 (1971) . An alternative motivation for impeachment by prior conviction is discussed by Justice Keeton in his dissenting opinion in State v. Owen, 253 P.2d 203, 224 (Idaho 1953) :
Every attorney with even limited experience in criminal practice, knows that impeachment of an accused in a criminal case is not, in fact, the real pUrpose of the examination. It simply pictures the misconduct and villaining of the accused and prejudices the jury by injecting. Prior crimes which are similar or identical to those presently charged may serve the dual purpose of impeachment and proof of motive, intent and lack of mistake.27e The prosecutor must be careful, however, since impeachment by similar crimes tends to show that the accused has a propensity to engage in illegal behavior. This latter purpose is dearly improper.2n
While there is an abundance of case law which upholds impeachment by "felonies" 2s or by prior v. Cantrell, 201 Kan. 182, 440 P.2d 580 (1968); Commonwealth v. Barron, 438 Pa. 259, 264 A.2d 710, appeal dismissed, 439 Pa. 614, 266 A.2d 476 (1970) ; Commonwealth v. Bastome, 211 Pa. Super. 509, 239 A.2d 863 (1968 State v. Smith, 262 La. 39, 262 So. 2d 362 (1972) ; State v. Lee, 485 P.2d 660 (Ore. the dictionary definition of "moral turpitude" is "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity .. .. ",21 the courts have applied the term to offenses ranging from fraud and prostitution to illegal entry.'" There is general agreement, at least, that drunkeness is outside the ambit of the definition. 2" 5 Another common categorization is "felonies and misdemeanors in the "crimen falsi" category." 6 Cir. 1969) (such cross-examination should be limited to acts or conduct which reflects upon integrity or truthfulness, or pertains to personal turpitude such as would indicate moral depravity or degeneracy); In re Huard, 125 Vt. 189, 212 A.2d 640 (1965) Commonwealth v. Felling, 214 Pa. Super. 207, 252 A.2d 200 (1969) ; Commonwealth v. Riddick, 212 Pa. Super. 390, 243 A.2d 174 (1968) . which are identical to or similar to the charges in the ongoing case also may generally be used. State v. Walter, 289 Minn. 309,184 N.W.2d 426 (1971) ; State v. Rodea, 132 N.J.L. 199, 39 A.2d 484 (1944) ; State v. Cook, 280 N.C. 642, 187 S.E.2d 104 (1972) 3 06 and petty offenses such as vagrancy'°7 typically cannot be used for impeachment. The majority view is that juvenile offenses are not properly useable for impeachment, 30 but some courts relax that prohibition in light of the seriousness of the offense, especially if the offenses have been adjudicated in a regular criminal court. 309 Minor military offenses such as a few hours A.W.OJL. are not suitable for impeachment, 10 but offenses such as burglary or larceny which would be useable if prosecuted in a civilian court, will not be disallowed because they arose under military jurisdiction. ' A conviction that is so remote that it has lost any real relationship to a witness or defendant's present credibility, may not be used to impeach. The standards by which remoteness is judged are quite flexible,au but with its adoption in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, the ten year limit 8o9 See, e.g., PROPosED Fxn. R. Evm. 609 (d) : The judge may, however, allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused, if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the judge is satisfied that admission is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence;
will probably gain acceptance as a general rule of thumb."" When determining remoteness, the courts look to the intervening conduct of the witness." 4 Therefore, a 1929 conviction for armed robbery which would otherwise have been termed remote, was useable for impeachment when it was followed by convictions for breaking and entering in 1937, receiving stolen property in 1945, breaking and entering in 1946, and armed robbery in 1956.15 Additionally, the courts look to the date that the punishment was terminated rather than to the date of the conviction for the actual offense." 6 To be used for impeachment, a judgment must be final; that is to say, the sentence must have been imposed by the judge."
7 Impeachment with a conviction that was not final at the time, but is final when a defendant claims error based upon that impeachment, may well be harmless error" 8 The pendency of an appeal does not render a conviction inappropriate for use in impeachment," 9 but a reversal of the verdict most certainly does. 0 o A pardon will normally not prevent the conviction's use,"" but the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence provide that if the pardon is based on rehabilitation, and the witness has not been convicted of a subsequent crime, or if the pardon is based upon innocence, the conviction is no longer useable for impeachment."' The imposition of probation as a sentence will not preclude the convic-tion's use, 32 3 nor will the fact that the verdict was reached after a guilty plea, 24 but there is conflict over whether a judgment based upon a plea of nolo contendere may impeach. 3 2 It has been held that a minor charge which is settled by a forfeiture of bond is not suitable for this purpose. 3 26 A constitutionally infirm prior conviction such as a conviction in which the accused was unrepresented by counsel also may not be used to impeach. 33 2 =See People v. Hampton, 5 Ill. App. 3d 220, 282 N.E.2d 469 (1972) ; People v. Spears, 83 Ill. App. 2d 18, 226 N.E.2d 67 (1967) State v. Knott, 6 Wash. App. 436, 493 P.2d 1027 (1972 . Contra, State v. Frey, 459 S.W.2d 359 (Mo. 1970) ; Goad v. State, 464 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1971) .
m See United States v. Bray, 445 F.2d 178, 181 (5th Cir. 1971) , where the court stated:
The probative fact is not whether he denied or admitted committing the offense for which he was convicted, but whether he committed the offense at all.. a guilty plea is often as much a result of an accused's realistic assessment of his chances to be acquitted should he go to trial as it is a result of any altruistic motive to come clean. See also State v. Marquez, 160 Conn. 47, 273 A.2d 689 (1970) ; A guilty plea before a magistrate not within his jurisdiction cannot be used. See People v. Burd, 18 N.Y.2d 447, 223 N.E.2d 24 (1966) . Rule 410 of the proposed federal rules provides that a guilty plea or an offer to plead guilty which is later withdrawn may not be used to impeach. PROPOSED FED. R. Evi. 410 Colo. 137, 471 P.2d 417 (1970) .
ml See Smith v. State, 453 P.2d 307 (Okla. 1969 ); State v. Willis, 4 Wash. App. 184, 480 P.2d 221 (1971) . This is an extension of the impropriety of the use of a constitutionally infirm conviction for enhancement enunciated in Burgett v. State, 389 U.S. 109 (1967) . The leading case is Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972) (the use of a prior invalid conviction to impeach the defendant denies him due process). See also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972) (Gideon violation); Gilday v. Scafati, 428 F.2d 1027 (1st Cir.) , cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970); People v. Coffey, 60 Cal. Rptr. 457, 430 P.2d 15 (1967) ; White v. State 11 Md. App. 423, 274 A.2d 671 (1971) ; Johnson v. State, 9 Md. App. 436, 265 A.2d 281 (1970 The fiat against impeachment with a legal involvement not ending in a conviction 3 precludes the use of arrests, 3 29 charges or indictments,," to impeach. Similarly, a charge which was nolle prossed is not useable for this purpose. m " A minority view allows a witness or defendant to be asked if he actually is guilty of a crime that may not have resulted in a conviction. This practice is based upon a distinction which is drawn between the personal knowledge of the witness and the charges or accusations of others.P' There are also cases which hold that the unlawful occupation of a witness may be shown to attack his credibility."
The prosecutor may usually inquire as to the name and location of a conviction' as well as its with arrest procedures in order to determine the voluntariness of his confession).
A few courts have held that impeachment by arrest is proper. See People v. Hoffman, 1 Mich. App. 557, 137 The prosecutor is of course held to a good faith standard when impeaching a witness.1 The failure to have the record of the conviction at his disposal is not necessarily erroneous when good faith is present.m Some jurisdictions do not allow any crossexamination at all on prior convictions and instead require introduction of the record to impeach.' the accused. 360 In any event, the examiner's questions must be based upon good faith 3 n Acts of misconduct useable for impeachment may be limited to those which are relevant to credibility."' This is similar to the "probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness" requirement of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.1S A broader approach is taken by courts which allow impeachment based upon any vicious or immoral act tending to relate to credibility.U4
Professor McCormick suggests that courts may look to five factors when determining whether or not to allow impeachment by acts of misconduct. Those factors are: 1) whether the testimony of the witness under the attack is crucial or unimportant, 2) the relevancy of the act of misconduct to truthfulness.... 3) the nearness or remoteness of the misconduct to the time of trial, 4) whether the matter inquired into is such as to lead to time-consuming and distracting explanations on cross-examination or reexamination, 5) whether there is undue humiliation of the witness and undue prejudice.
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Impeachment attempts which are founded in conduct that has at best, a remote bearing upon credibility, are frequently held to be improper. The most common of these is the attempt to discredit a defendant or defense witness through inquiry into an extra-marital affair or the birth of illegitimate children.an Forays into patterns of conduct such as homosexuality, drinking and fighting, or into an individual's personal associations also occur with regularity.f
There is a clear division of authority over whether narcotics addiction is a proper subject of cross-examination. Those courts favoring a broad range of inquiry in this regard cite the inherent unreliability of narcotics addicts as support for this position. 69 Other courts hold that the use of narcotics may be a subject of cross-examination only when there is reason to believe that the person being examined was under the influence of drugs at the time of the events in question.
be used to demonstrate that the defendant has a propensity to engage in criminal conduct. 72 Frequently, prior acts not otherwise admissible may be made so when put in issue on direct examination.rn X IMPEAc MNT ON GRouNms OF BiAs, INTEREST, HosTILITY Am CAPACITY The prosecutor has traditionally been allowed very broad latitude when cross-examining a witness to demonstrate bias, interest, hostility or lack of competence.
74 All of these qualities are viewed as having a bearing on the credibility of the witness' testimony.
Bias in favor of the defendant may be explored through inquiry into the witness' family ties, 75 friendship" 6 or romantic involvement with the accused.Y a In spite of the very real possibility of prejudice, a homosexual relationship between the defendant and the witness is a customary and proper subject of cross-examination.w Employments and financial tiesa as well as the existence X CROSS-ExAmNATION BY USE OF PHvsicAL EVIDENCE Within the limitations of reasonableness and propriety, cross-examination may include more than just a series of questions and answers devoid of movement or physical activity.P The most common source of physical interaction is the use of documents which have been introduced as evidence or have been used to refresh the witness' recollection on direct examination.n 9 These may be shown to the witness and questions based upon them may (proper to ask a witness if he was ever in a mental institution); State v. Miskell, 161 N.W.2d 732 (Iowa 1968 ) (proper to ask about whether witness declared incompentent); Commonwealth v. Carroll, 276 N.E.2d 705 (Mass. 1971 ) (proper to inquire about mental infirmities and idiosyncracies as well as a medical discharge from the army); State v. Vigliano, 47 N.J. 504, 221 A.2d 733 (1966) (error to refuse to allow the defense to examine a government witness as to his commitment for psychiatric observation); Sturdevant v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 142, 181 N.W.2d 523 (1970) (proper to examine regarding intelligence and physical or mental condition when relevant to credibility). But see State v. Crow, 486 S.W.2d 248 (Mo. 1972) People v. Smith, 15 Mich. App. 173, 166 N.W.2d 504 (1968) . be tendered. Similarly, photographs may be shown to the witness and his responses elicited." 0 A most interesting area of the art of cross-examination is the involvement of the witness (usually the defendant) in demonstrations while on the witness stand. While a witness cannot be required to do embarrassing or humiliating things before the jury, 39 ' within the bounds of relevance, he may be required to perform certain acts. Typically, he might be compelled to demonstrate to the jury the truth of a claim he has made on direct examination, such as that a weapon fired accidentally.
9
' Most commonly, a defendant may be required to briefly don a certain garment found at the crime scene such as a hat 39 ' or a jacket 9 4 to demonstrate proper fit and hence the likelihood of ownership. Defendants are also often called upon to produce handwriting exemplars on cross-examination when that is an issue in the case. 
